ABSTRACT The Raghavan petition to National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) concerns a sudden acceleration (SA) incident experienced by the petitioner's wife in a 2009 Lexus ES350 automobile. As she drove slowly into a parking space, the engine roared. When she braked, there was no response and the vehicle accelerated onto to a sidewalk into some bushes, hit a fence, and then stopped. The petitioner cites two other similar SA crashes where the electronic data recorder (EDR) results showed no pedal sensor voltage signals during most of the 4-5 s before impact. It would be reasonable to argue that the absence of accelerator pedal signals ruled out the possibility that the driver had been startled into flooring the accelerator pedal by mistake and holding it there, as required by the pedal error hypothesis and as presented in the NHTSA SA Report (1989). In the Raghavan denial of petition, NHTSA claims that drivers may have been making unrecorded accelerator pedal applications between EDR data points and that this proves that they were still making pedal errors. This ingenious counter hypothesis seems to require that the driver is startled into stomping on the accelerator pedal at 1-s intervals-each stomp being followed by a full pedal releaseprecisely timed to avoid detection by the EDR. This would require considerable right foot timing skills, muscular control, and dexterity on the part of an allegedly panic-stricken driver. This case study shows that NHTSA, in the process of denying Dr. Raghavan's petition, has done a volte-face and expediently abandoned the pedal error hypothesis, thereby undermining the claim in the 1989 SA Report that: for SAI in which there is no evidence of throttle sticking or cruise-control malfunction, the inescapable conclusion is that these definitely involve the driver pressing the accelerator instead of or in addition to the brake.
I. INTRODUCTION -THE BACKGROUND TO SUDDEN ACCELERATION INCIDENTS A. THE PURPOSE OF THIS CASE HISTORY
On February 15th 2015, Dr Gopal Raghavan's wife and daughter experienced a sudden acceleration incident in a 2009 Lexus ES 350. Dr Raghavan is a very well-qualified electrical engineer, with 20 years experience of high-speed integrated electronic circuit design. This incident, which he thought might have an electronic cause, prompted him to petition the US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to reopen an investigation into sudden acceleration in certain Toyota and Lexus models fitted with electronic throttles. He submitted his Petition in June 2015 [1] , [2] and it was denied by NHTSA in August 2015 [3] . Dr Raghavan's Denial of Petition (DP) is the latest in a series of DPs by NHTSA concerning Sudden Acceleration (SA) in automobiles stretching back over 3 decades. In these earlier DPs, NHTSA consistently relied on the Pedal Error Hypothesis (''drivers mistakenly applying the accelerator pedal instead of the brake.'') to explain SA incidents. However in the Raghavan SA incident the Electronic Data Recorder EDR results appear to contradict the Pedal Error Hypothesis. Rather than accept this contradiction at face value and re-examine the possibility of an electronic/software malfunction, NHTSA has put forward a new hypothesis of ''unrecorded accelerator pedal applications'' to explain the pre-crash (EDR) results. Because the old and new hypotheses differ fundamentally from one another and appear to be incompatible, the author has chosen to make the Raghavan denial of Petition the subject of this Case Study.
The rest of Part I provides a background to NHTSA's attempts over the years to deny the proper consideration of the possibility that SAs may be the result of intermittent electronic malfunctions. The Raghavan DP itself is critiqued subsequently in Parts II to VIII of this Case Study. [4] .
2) NHTSA is RESPONSIBLE FOR INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION OF AUTOMOBILE SAFETY DEFECTS
NHTSA is responsible for investigating safety defects in motor vehicles in the USA. NHTSA's Office of Defects (ODI):
''reviews consumer complaints, external manufacturer communications, and other information related to alleged safety defects so that ODI can decide whether to open an investigation, grant a petition for a defect investigation, determine the adequacy of safety recalls, and grant a petition for a public hearing on the adequacy of a safety recall'' [5] .
3) THE NHTSA ODI COMPLAINTS DATABASE AND ITS LIMITATIONS
ODI maintains a publicly accessible database of all complaints and recalls. Complaints data is compiled from the completed Vehicle Owner Questionnaire (VOQ), which requires the complainant to provide VIN number, make, model, year of vehicle and any documentation related to their complaint 'such as photos or a police report'. The ODI classifies complaints, according to 35 general and somewhat arbitrary categories of vehicle 'component or part', which are of little use for subsequent data analysis. See Appendix 1. Most SA complaints are found under VEHICLE SPEED, but some are to be found under 'POWER TRAIN' and others under 'UNKNOWN OR OTHER'. Although the consumer location is recorded, the record fields do not include data about the driver's age, height, sex, driving record etc.; the incident location or the duration of the SA incident; when in the drive cycle the incident occurred; whether or not the SA incident was the first or the latest in a series of incidents. The complaints information itself, which can be very informative is mainly contained in the free text of the customer complaint. However, complainants use many different terms to describe SA incidents, which means that it is only too possible for them to be misclassified. NHTSA admits to finding that subsequent searching the ODI database for SA incidents and trends has been difficult [6] .
4) US GOVERNMENT AUDITS HAVE IDENTIFIED DEFICIENCIES IN ODI's PROCESSES FOR HANDLING SAFETY RELATED INFORMATION
An audit carried out between in 2010-2011 by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) [7] assessed the effectiveness of ODI's processes for identifying and addressing safety defects related to Unintended Acceleration. The report concluded that ''Process improvements are needed for identifying and addressing Safety Defects''.
A further audit carried out by the OIG in 2015 [8] of ODI's vehicle safety procedures found a number of significant deficiencies: Castelli et al. [9] review the SA issue from the late 1970s, when the ODI first began to receive complaints, until the year 2000, just before the introduction of electronic throttles. Fig. 1 [9, Table 4 ] shows that ODI SA complaints over two decades increased from 75 in 1983 to a peak of 2983 in 1988 followed by a decline to 756 in 1998, followed by a rise to 1647 in 1999.
A number of SA-related recalls for electronic problems were reported to NHTSA during the 1980s 1 and it would therefore have been entirely reasonable for diagnosticians to infer tentatively that the sudden appearance and rapid rise in SA complaints might have been related to the widespread introduction of electronic cruise control. However, the 1988 NHTSA Audi 5000 SA Report, really the first major SA report, [10 VWOA has claimed that these incidents were the result of driver error, and that drivers reporting SAIs had inadvertently depressed the accelerator rather than the brake.'' <emphasis added> From these paragraphs it would appear that VWOA and ODI restricted their investigations to SA incidents attributable to ''consistent mechanical failures''. Denial of the possibility of intermittent malfunctions, especially intermittent electronic/software malfunctions, seems to have been built into the SA diagnostic process from the outset.
The 1989 NHTSA Sudden Acceleration Report, [11] which incorporates [10] as Appendix H, describes the results of a study to identify and evaluate factors which could potentially cause, or contribute to, the occurrence of SA incidents which it calls 'SAI' and defines as:
''unintended, unexpected, high-power accelerations from a stationary position or very low speed accompanied by an apparent loss of braking efficiency.'' 2 The report's Executive Summary lists 9 'logical assumptions that were used as the basis for the design of experiments and analyses'.
1. SAI could be the result of a single primary causal factor or could result from the action of a number of factors which contribute to or increase the likelihood of an SAI. 2. Factors relating to SAI occurrence can include powertrain design, brake system design, and vehicle economics (particularly pedal configuration). 3. An SAI must involve a significant increase in engine power, which could be caused by a failure in an enginecontrol system or a pedal misapplication (inadvertent depression of the accelerator instead of, or in addition to, the brake). 4. If the SAI begins with a vehicle-system malfunction, loss of control could occur through braking system failure or the driver's failure to apply the brake with sufficient force and/or the driver inadvertently pressing the accelerator. 5. If the SAI is initiated by pedal misapplication which the driver is unaware, loss of control can occur.
6. The location, orientation, and force deflection characteristics the pedals can influence the probability that the driver will mistake one pedal for another stop 7. if the cause of an SAI is an electro-mechanical or mechanical failure, this should be evident after the fact. 8. If the cause an SAI is an intermittent electronic failure, physical evidence may be very difficult to find, but the failure modes should be reproducible either through in-vehicle or laboratory bench tests. <emphasis added> 9. The vehicles studied may or may not share the same causal and contributing factors.'' As this author argues in [12] , by introducing in the 8 th of the above assumptions, 'reproducibility through in-vehicle or laboratory tests', as the litmus test for detecting intermittent electronic failures, NHTSA defines most possible electronic intermittencies out of existence and therefore 'proven' to be caused by driver pedal error. On this questionable diagnostic basis, the 1989 NHTSA SA Report confidently asserts in its technical summary (11, page 49) that:
''For SAI in which there is no evidence of throttle sticking or cruise-control malfunction, the inescapable conclusion is that these definitely involve the driver pressing the accelerator instead of or in addition to the brake.'' NHTSA's 'inescapable conclusion' of driver pedal error was clearly intended to settle the SA issue once and for all. In Section D following, the pedal error hypothesis will be considered in more detail.
D. THE PEDAL ERROR HYPOTHESIS
The pedal error hypothesis was developed by Human Factors experts during the 1980s to underpin claims by automobile companies in general and by Volkswagen of America (VWOA) in particular that SA incidents from at or near standstill could be explained by driver error. Schmidt and Young [13] (1997) provide a well referenced historical background. The hypothesis itself finds its full expression in the 1989 NHTSA SA Report, in particular in [11, Fig. 3 .0-1], as shown in Fig 2 below . The shortcomings of the pedal error hypothesis have been clearly identified in [12] .
NHTSA explains the workings of the pedal error hypothesis:
'' Figure 3 . Taking the Pedal Error hypothesis at face value:
1. the hypothetical driver is 'startled' out of their normal behaviour by something that 'startles' them and causes them to attempt an emergency braking procedure. Fig. 2 shows what vehicle malfunctions may 'startle' the driver into a 'pedal misapplication'. 2. the hypothetical driver misses the brake and hits the accelerator pedal by mistake and a SA incident is initiated 3. the hypothetical driver panics and fails to recognize and correct their mistake 4. the hypothetical driver continues to hold down the accelerator pedal believing that they are pressing the brake. The end result of driver 'startlement', however caused, would appear to be a misplaced and sudden reflex action of the right foot pressing the accelerator pedal right to the floor and holding it there for a number of seconds. There is, according to the hypothesis, nothing half-hearted, or tentative in the driver's alleged reflex response. Drivers, having mistakenly pressed the accelerator pedal to metal, allegedly enter such a catatonic state that they are unable to recognize their mistake and release the pedal.
The exoneration of the vehicle electronics, if justified, should mean that the incidence of SA incidents would be more or less vehicle-independent. There would be no reason to suppose that there would be sudden changes in the incidence SA incidents in particular makes of vehicle from one year to the next. On this basis, the SA problem ought to have disappeared into the river mists of history long ago.
The introduction of electronic throttles in the early 2000s might have been expected to proceed smoothly without any significant change in the incidence of SA complaints because electronic throttles were designed to have the same look and feel as the mechanical arrangements that they replaced.
In fact, the SA problem has kept on reappearing from time to time, rather like the proverbial bad penny, and has not been confined to any one manufacturer. Section E will now pick up the SA story as far as Toyota is concerned. [14] .
According to [15] NHTSA ODI conducted eight separate UA investigations involving Toyota products between 2000 and 2010.
Two investigations were initiated by ODI and resulted in recalls for alleged 'pedal entrapment.' 3 Five SA petitions from vehicle owners were denied by ODI. In the case of the remaining investigation, 4 concerning the ETC used in the 2002-3 Camry and Lexus ES300/350, 5 the petitioner had alleged that an ETC malfunction in a Lexus ES 300 had caused a low speed crash and the petition was granted, but the investigation was later closed on grounds that: ''A defect trend has not been identified at this time and further use of Agency resources does not appear to be warranted''.
The DP also made reference to 'application of the principles stated in the 1989 report':
' While NHTSA was busy applying 'the principles stated in the 1989 report' as a diagnostic tool to assist the denial of petitions to investigate SA incidents, SA incidents continued to arise: some causing death and serious injury.
In September 2007 Jean Bookout was in the process of leaving an Oklahoma highway in her 2005 Toyota Camry when it suddenly accelerated. She was unable to stop the car and it fell into a culvert She was injured and her passenger Barbara Schwarz was killed. Before she died, Schwarz called her husband on her mobile phone and said 'Jean couldn't get her car stopped. The car ran away with us. There is something wrong with the car' [16] .
Spurred on by Schwarz's dying words, the plaintiff's lawyers set about investigating the possibility that the root cause might lie in malfunctioning throttle control electronics and engaged leading experts to examine Toyota's electronic throttle system architecture and software code.
The Bookout v. Toyota case was finally heard in an Oklahoma State Court in October 2013. This was the first case in which malfunctioning electronics v. driver error became the central matter to be decided by the jury. The jury unanimously rejected Toyota's defence of driver error.
Critical to the outcome of this case in favour of the plaintiffs were the expert reports and testimony of Professor Phil Koopman of Carnegie Mellon University, who found extensive deficiencies in the architecture of the electronic throttle control software [17] , and Mr Mike Barr and his team at the Barr Group who analysed the huge body of software code and found ''a systematic software malfunction in the Main CPU that opens the throttle without operator actions and continues to properly control fuel injection and ignition'' that is not reliably detected by any fail-safe [18] .
Barr states: ''the jury in Oklahoma found that Toyota owed each victim $1.5 million in compensatory damages and, owing to the software defects and inadequate fail safes, also found Toyota acted with 'reckless disregard'. The latter legal standard meant the jury was headed toward deliberations on punitive damages when Toyota finally called for the plaintiffs to settle (for yet another undisclosed amount).''
As part of the Bookout non-disclosure agreement the expert witness reports of Koopman and Barr are kept under lock and key and are not allowed to be seen or discussed. Even the terms of the non-disclosure agreement are not to be disclosed. As of July 2015, Toyota had settled 338 SA cases, with secret agreements [19] . It seems unlikely that Toyota would have settled so many cases in such a short period of time unless they had felt that the plaintiffs would table the electronic/software evidence from the Bookout case in Court if the cases had gone to trial. Once each case is settled, it disappears off the radar screen and is made to seem as if it had never existed.
G. CURRENT THINKING ON THE CAUSES OF SA's
Although the automobile industry in general and NHTSA in particular have consistently denied the possibility that any SA incidents may be the result of intermittent electronic/ software malfunctions, others, in addition to the experts who gave evidence in the Bookout case, might beg to differ, for example:
• Gilbert and Trinidad [20] (2010) have shown that corrupted accelerator pedal position (APP) signals in some Toyota vehicles were not always detected by the Engine Control Module software and therefore did not trigger fault codes that ought to have sent the throttle control into the limp home position.
Potentially this design deficiency could result in unwanted engine speeds.
• Leideker et al. [21] (2011) have shown that a tin whisker induced short was responsible for the failure of a 2003 Toyota Camry accelerator Pedal Position (APP) Sensor based on a Dual Potentiometer Design.
• Sood et al. [22] 2011) also found significant numbers of tin whiskers growing on accelerator pedal sensors and an engine ECU that they examined. • Schmidt and Young [13] (2014) reviewed the SA situation as of early 2014, taking into account the 2011 NASA investigation [14] They critiqued the pedal error hypothesis, as found in the 1989 NHTSA Sudden Acceleration Report. In an appendix they analysed and compared the video record and the Electronic Data Recorder (EDR) record for a double SA incident in a 2012 Toyota Highlander and showed that they did not correlate.
• Park [25] • Belt [26] (2012) has developed a hypothesis that explains sudden accelerations from standstill in terms of failure of the battery to retain charge at idle, thereby losing much of its current smoothing capacity. Current transients caused by changing electrical loads can thus cause significant system voltage drops that, in turn, may upset the electronic throttle control software and trigger a SA incident. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned work, which points towards the possibility of intermittent electronic/software faults as the cause of at least some SA incidents, the pedal error hypothesis remains deeply embedded in NHTSA diagnostic thinking.
This institutional blindness to anything other than the pedal error hypothesis is well illustrated by the advisory notice that NHTSA issued 29 May, 2015 on ''Reducing crashes caused by pedal error'' [27] The only small cloud on NHTSA's horizon at the end of May 2015 was that some EDR results did not support the above assertion [13] in particular. Then three weeks after issuing this advisory with a fanfare of publicity, NHTSA received Dr Raghavan's petition. This seems to have caused NHTSA to have a rethink regarding the pedal error hypothesis as will be shown in Parts II to VIII of this case study which follow.
II. DR RAGHAVAN's PETITION
Dr Raghavan and his wife were owners of a 2009 Lexus ES 350 purchased new on March 7, 2009 . Up until February 2015, the car had travelled about 20,000 miles, or an average of 64 miles per week. 7 The car was in excellent condition and maintenance had been performed regularly by the local Lexus dealer in Thousand Oaks, California.
On February 13, 2015 his wife was driving their daughter to the dentist at around 4:30 PM. She pulled into the parking lot and she claims that she DID NOT have her foot on the brake pedal as she was coasting into the parking spot. The car suddenly accelerated.
Big bushes in front of the car limited the speed and his wife had the presence of mind to turn off the ignition and the car fell back.
A witness who saw the entire event attested to the fact that the engine suddenly started roaring. The front of the car was smashed, but Dr Raghavan's wife and daughter were unharmed.
Dr Raghavan had the car towed to a body shop and he contacted Lexus who sent a representative to download the EDR data, which was then sent to Lexus for analysis. Two and a half months after the accident the Raghavans received a letter from Toyota which stated:
' 7 An average mileage of 68 miles a week is unlikely to keep the battery fully charged and it is likely to suffer from premature ageing. 8 Table 1 in the DP lists the four pre-crash parameters available on the CAN bus that are stored by the EDR and shows the rates at which values of the parameters are refreshed and the resolution of each parameter.
Reading down the second column for parameter refresh rates:
• The Brake ON/OFF signal value is refreshed immediately: therefore the value at the moment of sampling is transferred into the EDR memory.
• The Engine RPM value is refreshed every 24 ms: therefore the value of RPM at some instant between 0 and 24 ms before the moment of sampling is transferred into the EDR memory.
• The vehicle speed value is refreshed every 500 ms, therefore the value of speed at some instant between 0 and 500 ms before the moment of sampling is transferred into the EDR memory
• The Accelerator Rate value is refreshed every 512 ms, therefore the value of accelerator rate at some instant between 0 and 512 ms before the moment of sampling is transferred into EDR memory. The recorded values of Vehicle Speed and Accelerator Rate at, for example, −0.5 seconds before impact might relate to −1 second before impact. See Fig. 4 . As far as resolution is concerned:
• The Brake Switch resolution is ON/OFF, and neither pedal force nor brake pressure can be deduced.
• The engine RPM resolution is 400 RPM, which means that any speed between 400 RPM and 799 RPM is recorded as 400 RPM and any speed between 800 RPM and 1199 RPM is recorded as 800 RPM. As a consequence an apparent speed change between EDR samples of 400 RPM might actually mean a speed change of anywhere between 1 RPM and 799 RPM. • Although the Accelerator Rate resolution is 0.039 volts, which is reasonably high, the refresh rate is 512 ms. Therefore although the parameter value may be accurate, its time cannot be determined to less than 512 ms. Considering the combined effects of refresh rate and resolution, it is clearly advisable to interpret any particular EDR data download set with great caution. 10 The DP continues:
''The EDR continuously performs 1Hz sampling of HS-CAN pre-trigger data and stores the data in a temporary buffer. The EDR only saves this data, along with the trigger data, when it detects a triggering event such as a crash.''
The DP fails to make clear that the EDR sampling rate for the above parameters (once per second, 1 Hz) is significantly lower than any of these refresh rates. The consequence, as well established by the Shannon Nyquist sampling theorem, is that data sampling at 1 Hz will miss any data with components that change at any frequency above 0.5 Hz, i.e. with a period of less than 2 seconds. 10 In the author's opinion, NHTSA are justified in pointing out in section 2,3,1 of the Denial of Petition that:''the common speeds recorded in the three vehicles are simply an artefact of the EDR vehicle speed resolution of 2 km/h. In all three incidents, the vehicles were travelling 6.0 -7.9 km/h (3.7 -4.9 
mph) prior to the accelerations, which the Toyota EDR records as 6 km/h (3.7 mph)....
Also the Denial of Petition fails to mention the possibility that the CAN Bus can suffer from overloads which could delay the passage of some data.
In the middle of 'Section 2.1 EDR pre-crash data' of the Raghavan DP NHTSA has placed the text and Figure 1 from a VTRC report, shown in this article as Fig. 4 .
• The blue dots in Fig.4 show the EDR recorded accelerator voltages during a simulated crash in a Camry 4D at −4 seconds, −3 seconds, −2 seconds, −1 seconds and −0.5 seconds before the simulated crash. 11 The blocks represent the possibility that each blue dot may have recorded the processed accelerator data anywhere in the period of 0.5 seconds before each of the blue dot positions.
• The continuous red line shows the accelerator pedal sensor voltage as recorded by the NHTSA Vehicle and Research Test Centre (VRTC). It would appear from the continuous red line that the driver of the test vehicle has sharply applied the accelerator pedal four times between the data points of −3.5 and −0.75 seconds.
The blue dots do not capture the following points on the red line:
1. the peak accelerator voltages at −3.25 secs and −2.9 secs, 2. letting off the accelerator pedal at −2.1 secs., 3. the sudden peak at −.75 secs. Blue dots at −2 secs and −1 secs capture the period of 1 second during which the accelerator pedal voltage appears to have been held fairly steady at just below 2 volts.
In the VTRC experiment the driver applied the accelerator multiple times just before a simulated crash and, as the continuous red line in Fig 4 shows, the EDR failed to capture meaningfully any of the accelerator position information that might have been gathered if the accelerator pedal voltage had been accurately and independently recorded. In particular, it fails to capture any of the glitch that has its peak at about −0.7 seconds (right-hand side of diagram) and indeed any of the other variations. This is to be expected because the refresh rate of the Accelerator Rate voltage (512 ms) and the EDR sampling frequency (1 Hz) are both far too low. Fig 4 illustrates the practical limitations of current EDRs as pre-crash data recorders. But since these limitations are well known why did NHTSA insert the figure and the accompanying explanation into this DP? The clue is provided by NHTSA's explanatory text:
''As the figure shows, the EDR does not necessarily capture all accelerator pedal applications during an event and the accelerator pedal voltage recorded at each EDR time interval may not be the actual accelerator pedal voltage at that interval''. <emphasis added> NHTSA appears to be preparing the ground for arguing later that the apparent absence of an appreciable accelerator pedal signal before a crash may be a positive indicator that 11 Validation Test #1, Strike #2. •
Pre-Crash data is recorded in discrete intervals. Due to different refresh rates within the vehicle's electronics, the data recorded may not be synchronous to each
other.'' NHTSA having forcefully pointed out the deficiencies of EDR data recording and simultaneously sown the seeds of the contrary idea that the VRTC research, as embodied in Fig 4, qualifies them to interpret EDR results more or less as they wish, now moves on in Section 2.2 of the DP to criticise the Petitioner's interpretation of the EDR results, see Section V following.
IV. ANALYSIS OF DP15-005: 'SECTION 2.2 CRASHES CITED BY PETITIONER
The petitioner cites three crashes after sudden accelerations from at or near standstill for which there are EDR records.
A. ANALYSIS OF SECTION 2.2.1 2009 Lexus ES 350 (THE PETITIONER's VEHICLE)
Fig . 5 shows the pre-crash data for the petitioner's vehicle. Note that the Accelerator Rate voltage of 0.78v is equivalent to the Accelerator being OFF. There is a peak of 2.38V at −0.6 seconds (i.e. 0.6 seconds before impact) followed at 0 seconds, the trigger point, by a return to 0.78 V.
Having emphasised in section 2.1 of the DP that EDR results do not necessarily give accurate pre-crash data, see 13 
''Although the driver alleged that the brakes were not effective during the incident, the brakes had no prior history of malfunction and the post-incident inspection did not identify any issues with the brake system.'' 5. ''Based on the available information, this incident is consistent with pedal misapplication by the driver and provides no evidence of a vehicle defect.''
It is hard to follow how points (1) to (4), singly or in any combination, could result in conclusion (5) namely: (a) that this incident is consistent with pedal misapplication by the driver and (b) provides no evidence of a vehicle defect.
The message of the DP seems clear: NHTSA has already decided that the incident was caused by pedal misapplication and therefore has no intention of carrying out a Defect Investigation. ''Based on the vehicle speeds recorded just prior to impact (t = −0.8 s), the Corolla was less than a car length from the parked vehicle and traveling 7 to 9 feet 13 Perhaps the driver was applying the brake and not the accelerator pedal. NHTSA does not appear to allow for this possibility. In other words, in spite of the fact that there is no evidence, NHTSA here assumes that there was a pedal misapplication. Fig. 7 shows the pre-crash data for the third example in the petition, a 2010 Toyota Camry. 14 Engine RPMs of 400 recorded at −5 seconds and −4 seconds could in fact be anywhere between 400 and 799 RPM, and may not necessarily have been very different from the engine speed at −3 seconds (between 800 and 1199 RPM).
C. ANALYSIS OF SECTION 2.2.3 TOYOTA CAMRY
There appears to have been an engine RPM increase of at least 400 RPM and possibly as much as 800 RPM between −3 seconds and −2 seconds, which is before the glitch in the accelerator seen at −1 seconds. It would therefore be hard to make the case that there was a high correlation between the Accelerator Rate and Engine RPM.
The vehicle speed increases from 3.7 mph at −3 seconds to 9.9 mph at −2 seconds before any change in the 14 This comes from NHTSA Toyota Pre-Crash EDR Field Inspections during March -August 2010 NHTSA-NVS-2011-ETC-SR10 page 16 Table 13 . Accelerator Rate. This gives a nominal speed change in one second of 6.2 mph, with a resolution of 1.2 mph. It would also therefore be very hard to make the case that that there was a high correlation between Accelerator Rate and change in Vehicle Speed.
The Denial of Petition has a Table 4 , see Fig. 8 above, containing the pre-crash data for VOQ01997750 using EDR tool Version 1.4.1.1.
The times in Fig. 9 differ from Fig. 8 by 0.3 seconds, which NHTSA glosses over. The parameter values remain the same except for the Acceleration Rate which is now recorded as a voltage.
• between −4.7 seconds and −2.7 seconds the Acceleration Rate voltage fluctuates, but the Vehicle Speed remains at 3.7 mph (i.e. between 3.7 and 4.9 mph). There seems to be very little correlation between Acceleration Rate and Speed.
• Between −2.7 seconds and −1.7 seconds the Acceleration Rate voltage drops from 0.98 volts to 0.78 volts, yet the engine speed rises from 800 to 1600 RPM and the vehicle speed rises from 3.7 mph to 13.7 mph.
• Between −0.7 seconds and 0 seconds the engine speed rises from 3200 to 4400 RPM and the vehicle speed rises from 13.7 mph to 19.9 mph, yet the Accelerator Rate falls from 3.71 volts to 1.37 volts.
In the opinion of this author, these figures are not selfexplanatory.
However, the DP sees the parameter variations differently: ''.....The driver reported having his foot on the brake when the acceleration occurred...
The EDR data for this incident shows no recorded service brake application during the event. Immediately prior to impact and after the vehicle had entered the parking space, the driver pressed the accelerator pedal to the floor when intending to apply the brake. As noted in the 2011 report, this incident is consistent with pedal misapplication by the driver and does not provide any evidence of a vehicle defect as suggested by the petitioner.'' <emphasis added>
Here NHTSA takes the steamroller approach and asserts that the driver pressed the accelerator pedal to the floor when intending to apply the brake without providing any supporting evidence and without considering any other possible explanations.
V. ANALYSIS OF DP015-005: 'SECTION 2.3 PETITIONER CLAIMS AND MISCONCEPTIONS'
The DP heading ''2.3 Petitioner claims and misconceptions'' speaks for itself and, in the opinion of this author, appears to pre-judge the petitioner.
no reasonable amount of analysis or testing can prove electronics and software have no errors. Therefore absence of proof that the ETCS-I has caused a UA does not vindicate the system.' ' The Denial of Petition continues: ''The common pattern is that the ''glitches'' occur at moments in the events when the driver should be initiating braking, but no braking has occurred.' ' The final paragraph in section 2.3.1 builds up from this rather strange statement and reads:
Thus the only common signature evident in the incidents is that in all three the surges occurred when the driver should have initiated braking for a vehicle entering a parking space at low speed. The fact that the vehicles suddenly accelerated just as they were beginning to enter their intended parking spaces instead of braking to a stop as intended is a signature of pedal misapplication by the driver. NHTSA has observed this signature in investigations of sudden acceleration dating back to the first such investigation that ODI opened in 1978. It is not isolated to any particular makes or models of vehicles or to any throttle design technologies.
In Section 2.3.1 the DP has hijacked the petitioner's ''strong signature of a common issue'' and has converted it, by a rather long-winded process, into a dogmatic assertion that any SA that occurs when the driver is slowly entering a parking space and is about to brake is, ipso facto, a ''signature of pedal misapplication by the driver''. Clearly NHTSA made up its corporate mind on the issue of sudden acceleration almost a working life time ago and is not in any hurry to change its mind now. Driver pedal it was then, is now, and ever shall be....
B. ANALYSIS OF SECTION 2.3.2 ENGINE RPM INCREASES
This Case Study questions NHTSA's assumption of unrecorded accelerator pedal applications, for which no evidence has been produced and which seems to reflect ignorance of data sampling fundamentals 16 and which would require considerable right foot timing skills, muscular control and dexterity on the part of the allegedly panic-stricken driver. Finally, the DP section 2.3.2 concludes:
''Thus the increase in recorded engine speed at −1.6 seconds could very well have resulted from the initial stages of the large pedal application that the EDR recorded at −0.6 seconds.'' The DP appears to be arguing is that an increase in engine speed may have occurred in advance of the movement of the accelerator pedal by one second. If that is the case, then the torque demand is not being generated by the accelerator pedal sensor voltage, but by something else. 16 Shannon Nyquist criteria which states that if you sample data, say once per second, i.e. at a frequency of 1 Hz, then the highest frequency at which data will be recorded accurately is half that, i.e. 0.5 Hz.
Throughout this section NHTSA has conspicuously avoided the possibility that an engine surge could have had an electronic cause. In the opinion of this author, these are very reasonable and constructive points to have put to NHTSA.
NHTSA answers Dr Raghavan on the subject of a common signature in the last paragraph of Section 2.3.1 in the Denial of Petition. Splitting this paragraph up into its four sentences it can be seen that in the first sentence NHTSA does not present a coherent argument against Dr Raghavan's assessment that is a ''strong signature of a common issue''. Instead NHTSA makes the following assertion:
(1) ''Thus the only common signature evident in the incident is that all three the surges occurred when the driver should have initiated braking for a vehicle entering a parking space at low speed.'' Comment Note the faulting of the drivers for allegedly failing to brake, for which no evidence is produced. This is followed by another assertion in the second sentence: If sudden accelerations from standstill were primarily the result of driver error they would be expected to have occurred in manual vehicles long before the advent of electronic cruise control in the 1970s. Yet to the best of this author's knowledge there is no evidence of this. Stuck open throttles yes, sudden accelerations from near standstill, no.
There is good evidence to suggest that SAs only occur in two kinds of vehicles:
• Vehicles with a manual throttle control and stand-alone electronic cruise control systems
• Vehicles with electronic throttles.
B. SURGING CAUSED BY IDLE CONTROL MALFUNCTION AND THE PEDAL ERROR HYPOTHESIS
Long before electronic throttles were first introduced, electronic idle speed control was commonplace. In the 1980s many SA incidents occurred in Audi 4000 and 5000 vehicles. These were subject to special investigation both by Audi and NHTSA and the results were reported in According to the pedal error hypothesis as found in the 1989 NHTSA SA Report and as propagated by NHTSA and the automobile industry ever since, the driver fully depresses the accelerator pedal in the belief that they are hitting the brake and, frozen in fear, continues to press the accelerator pedal.
In the hypothetical case of such a panic-induced sudden acceleration the accelerator rate signal would go to its maximum value very shortly after the pedal was fully depressed and would stay there. Such a constant accelerator rate signal is not found in any of the examples cited by Dr Raghavan.
In an attempt to explain this failure of the EDR results to fit the pedal error hypothesis, NHTSA has developed a new hypothesis in this DP which appears to require that drivers when coasting in to park, engage in some kind of multiple foot stomping action on the accelerator pedal which isn't detected by the EDR.
Consider such hypothetical pedal stomping activity, assuming for the moment that is a realistic possibility. Since the EDR data sampling rate is once per second (1 Hz), any stomping would also have to take place at the same frequency and be precisely syncopated with the EDR data sampling over a period of 4 to 5 seconds. To carry out a successful sequence of stomps, the driver would have to synchronise his foot actions with the data sampling of the EDR.
NHTSA have so far failed to produce any experimental evidence, peer-reviewed articles, or research reports that demonstrate that panicked drivers either could, or would, ever go into such a precisely timed, synchronized and syncopated pedal stomping routine.
D. OVERALL SIGNIFICANCE OF DP015-005
NHTSA has consistently maintained over the years that SAs from at or near standstill -if not the result of a sticky accelerator pedal, a stuck floormat or some very evident mechanical malfunction -must be the result of driver pedal error. The nature of that supposed driver pedal error has been defined by the pedal error hypothesis as laid out in the 1989 NHTSA SA Report. As recently as 29 May, 2015 NHTSA issued an advisory notice on ''Reducing crashes caused by pedal error'' [27] In other words, NHTSA is claiming that pre-crash data from vehicle EDRs has finally proved that drivers mistakenly press the accelerator pedal instead of the brake and cause SA incidents. After 40 years of investigation NHTSA is proclaiming for all the world to hear that at last it has proved itself to be conclusively right. It is now game set and match in favour of the pedal error hypothesis. Period! Shortly after this advisory notice was issued, Dr Raghavan submitted his petition citing 3 EDR results that did not support the pedal error hypothesis and required explanation. NHTSA responded by issuing DP015-005, which discards the pedal error hypothesis in favour of a novel and somewhat unconvincing counter-hypothesis that claims that drivers may have been making ''unrecorded accelerator pedal applications'' between EDR data points and that this proves that they were making pedal errors.
In this author's opinion, DP15-005 signals that NHTSA has now lost confidence in the pedal error hypothesis as an explanation of SA incidents.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
• The 1989 NHTSA Sudden Acceleration Report asserted:
''For SAI in which there is no evidence of throttle sticking or cruise control malfunction, the inescapable conclusion is that these definitely involve the driver pressing the accelerator rather than the brake.''
• For over a quarter of a century since, NHTSA has maintained that the most likely cause of low speed SA incidents is drivers being ''startled'' out of their normal driving behaviour into making pedal errors -that is to say, mistakenly pressing the accelerator to the floor and continuing to do so in the belief that they were carrying out an emergency braking manoeuvre.
• As recently as 29 th May 2015, NHTSA issued an advisory notice on ''Reducing crashes caused by pedal error'' [27] that says: ''......Field investigations over the past five years by NHTSA and others using precrash pedal application data from vehicle event data recorders have determined that drivers who believed they were applying the brake in such incidents were often mistakenly applying the accelerator instead.''
• The signature of such hypothetical ''pedal errors'' would necessarily be that the accelerator pedal voltage and hence the EDR Accelerator Rate voltage rapidly reached their maximum values shortly after the moment when the SA was initiated and remained at that value until the vehicle crashed.
• It is evident that in none of the three cases cited by the petitioner did the EDR accelerator rate match this hypothetical ''pedal error'' profile. This strongly suggests that for most of the 4 to 5 seconds before the three crashes the accelerator pedal was not depressed.
• NHTSA has clearly recognized that the three SA incidents cited by Dr Raghavan do not fit the pedal error hypothesis. Otherwise the writers of the DP would not have taken the drastic step of jettisoning the pedal error hypothesis and substituting a new hypothesis based on the questionable assertion that that drivers may have been making ''unrecorded accelerator pedal applications'' between EDR data points.
• This Case Study questions NHTSA's assumption of unrecorded accelerator pedal applications, for which no evidence has been produced, which seems to reflect ignorance of data sampling fundamentals 18 and which would require considerable right foot timing skills, mus- 18 Shannon Nyquist criteria which states that if you sample data, say once per second, i.e. at a frequency of 1 Hz, then the highest frequency at which data will be recorded accurately is half that, i.e. 0.5 Hz. cular control and dexterity on the part of the allegedly panic-stricken driver.
• NHTSA, by discarding the pedal error hypothesis for the novel and somewhat questionable hypothesis of ''unrecorded accelerator pedal applications'', provides a clear signal that some EDR results cannot be explained as the result of alleged pedal error. This is precisely the point that Dr Raghavan was making in his petition.
• The unexpected result of the Raghavan Denial of Petition is that NHTSA seems to have undermined the pedal error hypothesis thereby casting doubt on the validity of its own 'inescapable conclusion' in the 1989 NHTSA Report.
• NHTSA, having inadvertently but successfully cleared the decks of the pedal error hypothesis, should now be encouraged to re-examine the possibility that intermittent electronic/software malfunctions in electronic throttle systems are the most likely root cause of at least some SA incidents. 
APPENDIX II EXAMPLES OF INCIDENTS OF SUDDEN ACCELERATIONS FROM AT OR NEAR STANDSTILL REPORTED TO NHTSA. SIX DIFFERENT MAKES OF VEHICLE AND DIFFERENT MODEL YEARS 2007 -2015

